Today, I am pleased to present a guest post by Adam Pagnucco:

If Montgomery County Democrats want to substantially increase their turnout in the 2018 election, they are going to have to reach out to Democratic non-voters who are disproportionately young, Latino, African American, low income and who live far from the party’s traditional Downcounty strongholds.

How can that be done?

First, this is not a job that can be entrusted to candidates alone.  Candidates are in the business of winning elections, and for them, that means targeting regular voters.  That’s perfectly understandable.  Asking candidates to do things that don’t maximize their chances to win is a non-starter.  So this is a job for the party.

Montgomery County’s Democratic Party is in some ways the envy of the rest of the state.  It is large and well-financed.  It can draw on lots of volunteers and activists, many of whom have substantial campaign experience.  It has a system of precinct officials that most county parties don’t have.  But in recent years, it has presided over declining turnout.  Like any organization, even successful ones, the party can improve.  Here’s how.

1. Buy an email list and use it.

At the moment, the party does not have an extensive email list.  It needs one – badly.  The party should purchase an email list of regular voters – including unaffiliated ones – and start pumping out regular blasts.  The state party does this and the county party should start doing it too.  But in addition to the frequent attacks on the GOP that appear in state party emails, the county party can also celebrate the successes of local government.  The Montgomery County Council regularly passes progressive legislation, often on unanimous votes, and the County Executive leads a progressive administration.  The declining local media misses out on a lot of these things, so the party should step in and spread the word.

2. Get stronger on social media.

The county party’s Facebook page needs to be bolder and more topical.  It should be aggressive about going after the GOP and it should also trumpet Democratic successes.  Ads should be used to spread particularly good posts and to build the like count.

3. Contact non-voters and new voters directly.

Years ago, before the spread of e-recruitment, the party had a system for welcoming new voters.  That system should be reinstated and updated.  The party can use its precinct officials to reach out to non-voters and new voters on the ground.  One way would be to send precinct officials lists of all of these voters and have them circulate an online survey through flyers in their neighborhoods.  Do they vote?  If not, why?  Is it lack of information?  Are there important issues they want addressed?  Ask them to sign up for the email list and Facebook page to stay in touch with the party.

4. Spotlight new Democrats.

Non-voters and new voters don’t look like Mike Miller or Mike Busch.  They look like many young, new Democratic state legislators like Senator Craig Zucker and Delegates Eric Luedtke, David Fraser-Hidalgo, Ariana Kelly, Marc Korman, Marice Morales, David Moon, Will Smith, Pam Queen and Shane Robinson.  (And those are just the ones who first took office in 2010 or later.)  Let new Democrats like these do guest communications in the blast emails and also on a county party blog.  Then spread them through Facebook and Twitter.

5. Get rid of the sample ballot.

The above items will cost money, and a good place to get it is by getting rid of the sample ballot.  This drab, antiquated pamphlet mailed to all Democrats before the general election looks worse than a typical coupon book and is probably discarded promptly by most recipients.  The party spends tens of thousands on printing and mailing it every cycle.  Besides causing headaches for no good reason, the sample ballot distracts from the party’s central duties because it is the vehicle for communicating party positions on ballot questions, and that can cause problems.

One example was the party’s decision to go against labor on the police effects bargaining ballot question in 2012.  Regardless of who was right or wrong, the decision caused labor to picket the party’s spring fundraiser and resulted in wholesale turnover on the party’s central committee.  The party’s primary duty is to market its candidates and their successes.  It should not concentrate on making policy decisions outside of its stated platform; those should be left to elected officials.

The sample ballot has been around for a long time and it has its defenders, but party strategists need to ask themselves the following question.  How many email addresses, Facebook ads, staff hours and other voter touches can be purchased by freeing up money from the sample ballot?  And what mix of all of these factors generates the greatest cost effectiveness for outreach?

If all of these things are done, will that guarantee higher turnout among MoCo Dems who currently don’t vote in 2018?  Well, there are few guarantees in politics, folks.  But I will guarantee this: if none of these things are done, turnout will not improve and Governor Larry Hogan will get a second term.

Today, I am pleased to present a guest post by Adam Pagnucco:

Age is the biggest difference between MoCo Democrats who always vote in gubernatorial general elections and those who don’t.  Here are a few other differences.

Household Income

The voter registration file contains the addresses of all registered voters.  The Census Bureau tracks household income over the 2009-2013 period by zip code, municipality and owner vs renter status.  We integrated Census income data with the voter file and found these voting patterns.

Super-Dems and non-voters can be found in every income group but there is a correlation between voting and income.  The average household income of super-Dems is 17% higher than non-voters.  Super-Dems are more likely to have household incomes of $200,000 or above (19%) than are non-voters (11%).  Conversely, non-voters are more likely to have household incomes of under $100,000 (23%) than super-Dems (12%).

Geography

Super-Dems and non-voters also tend to have different residence patterns.  Below are their distributions by city and town.

Super-Dems are most likely to live in Kensington, Chevy Chase, Bethesda and Potomac, in that order.  Non-voting Dems are most likely to live in Germantown, Clarksburg, Montgomery Village and Gaithersburg, in that order.

Below is the same data presented by council and legislative district.

Super-Dems are most likely to live in Council District 1 and Legislative District 16 – again, in the BCC-Potomac vicinity.  Non-voting Dems are most likely to live in Council District 2 and Legislative District 39, which contain Germantown and Montgomery Village.

Race

The voter file does not contain racial data.  But the Census Bureau does have racial data by Census tract, and we integrated that into the voter file.  Below is the distribution of super-Dems and non-voters in the precincts that have the highest percentages of black, Hispanic and Asian residents.

Voting patterns in Asian precincts don’t vary much.  But non-voters are significantly more likely to live in precincts with high black and Hispanic populations than super-Dems.

In summary, the following characteristics apply to super-Dems in order of likelihood.  Super-Dems are most likely to:

1. Be age 60 or over
2. Be age 50-59
3. Live in Kensington
4. Have average household incomes of $200,000 or more
5. Live in Chevy Chase
6. Live in Bethesda
7. Live in Potomac
8. Live in Council District 1

Non-voting Dems are most likely to:

1. Be age 39 or younger
2. Live in Germantown
3. Live in Clarksburg
4. Live in precincts that are 33% or more Hispanic
5. Live in Legislative District 39
6. Have average household incomes of less than $100,000
7. Live in precincts that are 33% or more African American
8. Live in Council District 2

How can the non-voting Dems be turned into voting Dems?  We will conclude with a few suggestions to do that in Part Four.

Today, I am pleased to present a guest post by Adam Pagnucco:

Who are these registered MoCo Democrats who don’t vote?  Let’s find out.

The table below presents data on registered Montgomery County Democrats from the January 2015 voter registration file.  As of that date, there were 360,427 registered Democrats in MoCo.  The file contains their voting histories in the primary and general elections from 2006 on.  Most MoCo Democratic candidates running in primaries, which tend to decide elections here, concentrate their voter contact on the 42,692 people who voted in each of the last three primaries.  (They account for 12% of MoCo Dems and 5% of the county’s voting age population.)  But for the purpose of this analysis, we will be examining three groups: all registered Democrats, those who voted in each of the last three gubernatorial general elections (Super Dems) and those who have voted in no gubernatorial generals (Non-Voting Dems).

The first fact that stands out is that the non-voters are a larger group than the super-Dems.  There were 98,791 Democrats in the file who voted in each of the 2006, 2010 and 2014 general elections.  But there were 127,851 Democrats who did not vote in any of them.  That fact alone should worry state and county Democratic strategists who are looking to generate more turnout to defeat Governor Larry Hogan.

Another fact that stands out is that of the 127,851 Democrats who did not vote in any of the gubernatorial generals, 73,306 voted in at least one of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections.  This group accounts for 20% of all MoCo registered Dems.  Why are they voting for President and not for Governor?  Let’s remember that Hogan’s statewide victory margin in 2014 was 65,510 votes.  If half of these presidential-voting Democrats showed up in 2014 and voted for Anthony Brown, Hogan’s margin would have been cut by more than half.  If half of all of the non-voting MoCo Dems had showed up to vote for Brown, Hogan’s margin would have been nearly eliminated.

Let’s zero in on a few demographic factors pertaining to MoCo Dems.

Gender

Women account for majorities of registered MoCo Dems, super-Dems and non-voters.  No surprise here.  Women dominate the rank and file of the Democratic Party even if they account for less than a majority of its elected officials.

Age

Age is the single most meaningful variable differentiating super-Dems from non-voters.  The average age of super-Dems is 61.  The average age of non-voting Dems is 39.  Fifty-three percent of super-Dems are age 60 or older.  In contrast, sixty percent of non-voting Dems are 39 or younger.

Here’s a different way of looking at age.  Following are the turnout rates for Democrats by age group in the 2014 general election.

Democrats in their 60s and 70s were at least twice as likely to vote as Democrats in their 30s or younger.  Nearly 100,000 MoCo Dems in their 30s or younger did not vote in the 2014 general.

Low turnout among young people is not exclusive to MoCo – it’s a nationwide phenomenon.  But because so many young Democrats in MoCo are not voting, that suggests the party needs a strategy to get them to the polls to realize significantly higher turnout in 2018.

We will look at more differences between super-Dems and non-voters in Part Three.

I’m following the lead of my students and heading out of town on Spring Break. Fortunately, Adam Pagnucco has written a series on Montgomery Democrats who don’t vote. Today, I am pleased to present the first part:

General Assembly Democrats have decided to pursue automatic voter registration in this year’s session.  There’s a good policy rationale for it and efforts to increase resident access to voting are generally commendable.  There is also a fair dose of politics here. Democrats are pursuing this because they think it will net them more votes, and Republicans are opposing it for the same reason.  Yet, there’s little evidence in our state that increasing registration will automatically increase votes for Democrats in gubernatorial elections.

Instead of concentrating on people who don’t register, Democrats should look at a different group for the purpose of expanding their turnout: people who register as Democrats but don’t vote.

Why do people register but don’t vote?  Part of the explanation lies in how relentlessly targeted modern political campaigns are.  In a context of scarce resources, campaigns strive to touch voters who a) are likely to actually vote and b) are potentially receptive to the candidate’s message.  That means orienting mail, email, field operations and even social media towards voters with regular histories of voting.  Those voters who vote regularly get inundated with candidate communications.  Those who don’t get much less of it.

Consider me.  I moved to the county in 2003.  I had a long history of voting in D.C. and New York but that didn’t show up in my Maryland voter registration record.  I voted in the 2004 primary and general elections.  In my first state-level election of 2006, only two candidates sent me mail: Hans Riemer and Duchy Trachtenberg, both non-incumbents running for the County Council.  Both had well-financed operations and perhaps they felt they could take a chance on appealing to a wider field of voters than just those who had voted in 1998 and 2002.  County Executive candidates Ike Leggett and Steve Silverman, who raised over $3 million between them, didn’t contact me.

Now, if I was feeling ignored, that didn’t last!  I continued to vote regularly and by 2010, I got lots of mail.  Don’t ask me about 2014.  My recycling can is still recovering.

So what is likely to happen to all the new voters who are automatically registered under the state Democrats’ proposal?  They will probably be ignored by Democratic candidates for state and local office because they don’t have voting histories.  Some of them might vote in presidential elections because information on those candidates is easy to come by.  (Who on Planet Earth has not heard of Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump?)  But a combination of declining local media coverage and micro-targeted local campaigns will give them no information on local races and lots of them will sit out.

That is exactly what is happening in Montgomery County.  From the 1990 general election through the 2006 general election, voter registration rose from 365,960 to 507,924 – an increase of 39%.  At the same time, the actual number of general election voters rose from 211,199 to 308,429 – an increase of 46%.

Now let’s remember what happened around the end of that time period.  The presidential campaigns of Howard Dean and Barack Obama took voter targeting to a new level with email, data-mining and (later) social media.  Campaigns became much more efficient at reaching small groups of likely voters.  And all of this filtered down into state and local races, especially in MoCo, where so many candidates and campaign staffers have ties to the national level.

This had an impact in Montgomery County.  From the 2006 general election through the 2014 general election, voter registration rose from 507,924 to 634,663 – an increase of 25%.  But the actual number of voters dropped in 2010 and again in 2014.  The 2006 general saw 308,429 voters while the 2014 general saw 267,456 voters – a decline of 13%.  At the same time, the number of MoCo voters in presidential general elections has been rising steadily in every cycle since at least 1990.

What we are witnessing now is a shrinking snowball effect.  As each gubernatorial cycle passes, the pool of targeted voters shrinks as people who vote regularly pass away or move out.  And those without voting histories are ignored by candidates, and don’t vote, and so their numbers grow.

This should be a major concern for both Maryland and MoCo Democrats, because low turnout in MoCo (as well as Baltimore City and Prince George’s) significantly contributed to Larry Hogan’s winning the Governor seat.  More registration won’t fix it.  More efforts to turn out an ever-smaller group of regular Democratic voters won’t fix it.  But communicating with people who are already registered Democrats and who, for whatever reason, aren’t voting just might fix it.

So who are these Democrats who don’t vote?  We’ll find out in Part Two.